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WhIere a conveyance of real estate, and a separate defeasance thereof, are
dated on different days, though'delivered on the same clay, they do not necessarily constitifte a mortgage.
Parol evidence is admissible of the disibctieacl of the parties, or to show
that soine time has elapsed, or some Oircumstance has occurred to satisfy the
court that the contracts were separate, but not of the mere wnderstanding of
the parties, or their belief as to the legal effect of their acts.
Where a deed of antecedent date, founded upon an acknowledged sale, is alleged to be changed into a mortgage by a subsequent defeasance, the burden of
proof is upon the party averring the change in its character.
The fact that the cousideration in the deed was the full value of the property
repels the idea that the conveyance was intended only as a security. So, also,
the fact that there was no obligation on the part of the plaintiffs to pay
the debt is inconsistent with the idea that the transaction amounted to a
mortgage6.

Certificate from Nisi Prius.
This was a bill in equity containing the following averments:
In 1868, Mrs. II. A. Hanson was owner in fee of a house
and lot in Philadelphia, subject to a mortgage of '7,500. M[r.
Hanson, her husband, was largely indebted to the defendant,
J. E lgar Thomson, and an arrangement was partly ibected
by which the defendant was to purchase the house and lot
for $30,000 (subject to the mortgage), which he was to pay
part ly in cash and partly in the release of 11anson's indebtedness.
A deed for the property from iianson and wife to Thomson
was executed and acknowledged, dated May 31, 1858. It was
shortly afterward tendered to Thomson, and declined on lie
ground that the price was too high. Subsequently Thonison
advanced money to Mrs. Hanson, through her huisband, to
enable her to comlplete the house, whiCh was not yet fillisled.
A statement of account beieenii Thoi.soll aild Hlanson, made
in October, 1859, showed that Thomison had advanced $9,000,
and he then agreed that lie woihi adv\ance in money and
property, $15,000 more, maling altogether an indebtedness
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of $24000, which it was agreed should be secured upon Mrs:
Hanson's house. It was first proposed to secure this by bond
and mortgage and a lease, but Mrs. Hanson declined to execute the mortgage, and it was therefore agreed to substitute
a direct conveyance to Thomson, with a written defeasance.
To avoid further expense and delay, the deed already executed and acknowledged was used and delivered to Thomson,
October 1.0, 1859, and subsequently put upon record, and at
the time -of the delivery of the deed, a written agreementbetween Thomson and Hanson was executed by them, reciting
the deed, and that, in consideration thereof, Thomson had
paid and given value to the amount of $21,030.75, and agreed
to pay $3,000 more; and thereupon it was agreed between
the said Thomson and Hanson as follows: "That if the said
William R. Hanson and wife, or either of them, their or
either of their heirs, executors or administrators, will pay to
said John E. Thomson, his executors or administrators, the
sum of $24,030.75, on or before the 1st day of May, 1863, if
not previously sold, that then he, the said John E. Thomson,
shall grant and convey said messuage and lot to said Hannah
A. Itanson, in fee, or to whomsoever she in writing may direct;" with a proviso that in case of such payment and
conveyance before May 1, 1863, Thomson might retain the
occupation of the property until that day. as a tenant, at a
rent of $2,000, payable to Mrs. Hanson, to be computed from
the date of such re-conveyance. The agreement was dated
October 10, 1859, "being the same day and time when said
indenture of May 31, 1858 was delivered to said John E.
Thomson."
The bill further averred that Thomson had taken and held
possession of the property since the agreement; that on May
20, 1864, Mrs. Hanson had demanded from Thomson in writing a re-conveyance of her property on payment of the
amount due, which she was prepared to make ; and requested
a statement of the account, to which Thomson had not replied. And further averred the death of Mrs. Hanson; her
will, by which plaintiffs were appointed her executors and
trustees; and contained an offer to pay whatever was justly
due to Thomson on settlement of accountq.
VOL. XX.-44
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The defendant, Thomson, in his answer, averred that the
deed of May 31, 1858, was voluntarily prepared and executed
by Hanson and wife in pursuance of an agreement that the
property should be conveyed to him, in fee, in payment of
Hanson's indebtedness and other moneys and property which
he agreed to pay and transfer. He refused the deed when
tendered, because he was then on his way tQ the cars on a
journey and had no opportunity to. examine it. He denied
that the negotiation failed, but said that he perform'edhis part
of it, and was entitled to the delivery of the deed, which was
evaded and postponed, and further conditions sought to be
added, with which he was finally compelled to comply. Ile
admitted that the deed was delivered contemporaneously with
the agreement of October 10, 1859. He denied that any
other mode of securing him was taken into consideration, and
asserted that the conveyance was, and was intended to be, the
execution of an absolute and complete sale and transfer, for a
consideration which exceeded the real value of the property.
He denied that any settlement of accounts between himself
and Hanson took place in October, 1859, or at any time; and
that it was ever agreed to substitute a conveyance to him
with a written defeasance in the place of a mortgage, and
averred that ever since May 31, 1858, he had been entitled to
have the deed delivered to him, but had been baffled and deceived by Hanson; that Hanson finally offered to deliver him
the deed, if he would agree to sell him the property back at
cost price at any time before May 1, 1863; that he did so
agree, provided the prop.;rty was not previously sold, and he
inserted the words "if not previously sold," in the writing before signing it, designing not to limit his absolute ownership,
or power of disposing of the property.
The Master reported that he had no evidence before him
touching the deed and agreement of October 10, 1859, except
the papers themselves. There was no doubt in his mind that
they formed one transaction, and together constituted a mort. gage given to Mr. Thomson to secure money loaned by him.
Consequently, the devisees of Mrs. Hanson were entitled to a
re-conveyance, upon payment of what was justly due to the
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defendant, Treitor, under the agreement, although the time
limited therein for redemption had expired.
On exceptions, the court (READ, J.) confirmed the Master's
report, and decreed accordingly.
The defendant, Thomson, appealed, and the cause was thereupon certified to the court in bane.
Thee. Cayler for the appellant.
It is clear that the parties did not intend to enter into a
transaction in the nature of a mortgage.
1. This is shown by the pleadings.
2. The words "if not previously sold," in the agreement,
are inconsistent with the idea of a mortgage, there being no
liability to account accompanying the power of sale.
3. The bill shows that the deed, when executed, was in.
tended to convey a fee.
4. There was no obligation on Mr. or Mrs. Hanson to pay
any debt. Mr. Thomson could not tender a re-conveyance
and demand his money.
5. The price paid exceeded the value of the premises.
He cited Lane v. Shears, 1 Wend. 433; Coote on Mortg. p.
11; 5 Bac. Abr. 5; lVilliaims v. Owen. 10 Sim. -386; 5 My.
and Or. 306; Goodman v. Ericson, 2 Ball and B. 274; Sabine
v. Barrell, 1 Vern. 268; Perry v. Afeadowcroft, 4 Beav. 197;
Davis v. Thomas, 1 Russ. and M. 506; Newcomb v. Bonham,
1 Vern. 8, 214, 232; Langton v. Horton, 5 Beav. 9.
J. Cooke Lonystreth, Henry Wharton and Eli K. Price for
appellees.
The transaction did create a mortgage.
1. If there is one Pennsylvania doctrine which cannot now
be shaken, it is that a deed with a contemporaneous agreement to re-convey upon the payment of a sum of money, is
as much in effect a mortgage, as if the defeasance had been
contained in the same instrument; and that parol evidence is
inadmissible to show that a conditional sale was intended:
Colwell v. lTVoods, 3 Watts 188; Kerr v. Gilmore, 6 Watts
406; Kunkel v. TFolfersberger, 6 Watts 126; Hiester v. J14deria, 3 W. and S.388; Brown v. Nickle, 6 Barr 390; Ritenbaugh v. Ludwick, 7 Casey 138; Wilson v. Shoenberger, 7 Casey
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299 ; Houser v. Lamont, 5 P. F. Sm. 316 0 Kellum v. Smith, 9
Casey 158; Harper'sAljeal 14 P. F. Sm. 315.
2. The intention of the parties makes no difference. The
English cases holding a different doctrine are not authorities
here: Colwell v. Wood, supra, Wilson v. Shoenberger, supra.
3. The words "if not previously sold," merely confer a
power of sale, a very common incident in a mortgage; it
cannot alter the character of the transaction: Directors v.
Royer, 7 Wright 146.
4. Mrs. Hanson was only a surety. If it was a sale, why
were not the securities for the debt due by her tlusband
transferred to her: Rhines v. Baird, 5 Wright 264.
5. Why should she borrow money to complete improvements, if the transaction was a sale?
6. The fact that there was no obligation to pay appellant
the $24,000, is nothing. Such an objection was overruled in
Wharf v. Howell, 4 Bin. 499; in Stwever v. Stcsver, 9 S. and
R. 488; in Jaques v. Weeks, 7 Watts 268, and subsequent
cases.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
AGNEw, J.-This case is peculiar, having no exact counterpart in.any found in our books. The master thought that
the bill and answer neutralized each other, and being thus
counterpoised, the case must be decided on the face of the
deed and the so-called defeasance. Having arrived at this
conclusion, he then pronounced the transaction to be a mortgage on the face of the papers, as a security or advances by
Mr. Thomson to Mrs. Hanson, with a power of sale on part
of the former. The master says expressly, the only evidence
before him touching the deed and agreement are the papers
themselves. If this were the whole case, his conclusion would
be justified by Colwell v. Woods, 3 Watts 188; Kerr v. Gilmore, 6 Watts 404, and other cited cases. In Brown v.
Nickle, 6 Barr 390, this court, commenting on Colwell v.
Woods, and Kerrv. Gilmore, remarked: "In the first of them
it was determined that a conveyance and simultaneous covenant to reconvey on payment of the purchase money before a
given day, must be construed to be a mortgage, though it ap-
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pear by parol that the parties did not intend it to be so; and
in the second, that it is not competent to the parties to prove
by parol that the defeasance was a subsequent and independent agreement. These cases (said the court) are not to be
resisted, yet we must suppose that there may be in some shaye
and under some circumstances,such a thing as a conditionalsale.

But the proof proposed in this instance was not of distinctive
acts which constitute it, but of the understandingof the parties. Their understanding, however, must be gathered from
the writing, and if that be ambiguous on the face of it, it cannot be gathered from the parol proof." The court also remarked that Kerr v. Gilmore "pushed the doctrine to its utmost verge." Now, if we turn to. Kerr v. Gilmore, we find
that the deed and defeasance were dated on the same day, and
executed by the parties at the same time and before the same
persons; and the offer was to prove that the deed was first
executed, and then at the suggestion of one of the parties
that it Would be a benefit to have the privilege of repurchasing, the agreement was put in writing and executed after the
deed had been executed, and the parties then spoke of it as a
sale. Such is the nature of the evidence held in Kerr v. Gilmore to be incompetent, and it is clear its true character was
an attempt to prove the mere understanding of the parties
against the legal character of the papers, as it appeared on
their face. Hence, it was said by Justice HUSTON in the
opinion, "that it has become impossible to draw any conveyance, nay, to make any contract by which property shall be
redeemable for a certain period, and cease to be so after that
period has elapsed." Yet in the same opinion we find qualifications which evidence the extent of the decision. In connection with his statement that two instruments-a deed and
a defeasance of the-same date are necessarily a mortgage-he
also says that "all the cases show that all the circumstances of
the whole transactionare inquired into, in chancery, and in
our own courts." In another part of the opinion he qualifies what he had said, in these words: "If a case can occur
where such conveyance and defeasance do not constitute a
mortgage, it must be one in which some time has elapsed, some
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circumstance has occurred, to satisfy the court and jury that
the contracts were wholly separate; that the first was always
intended as a real, actual sale, and the second bargain a real
distinct agreement to purchase again property which had once
been actually sold; but the two bargains cannot be made in
the same hour and day, nor evidenced by instruments executed
as these were before the parties separated, and before the witnesses to thefirst instrument left the room, or any new information had been communicated." That a case can arise wherein
the first instrument can be shown to be a real sale, and the
second an unconnected resale, is proved by Spering's Appeal,
10 P. F. Smith 199, where the first instrument was an actual
sale under a power contained in a former pledge of .stock, for
the very purpose of conversion to redeem the pledge, and the
second was an independent agreement to resell the same kind
of stock, in order to give the former owner the rise of
the market for a stipulated time. 1eitenbaugh v. Ludwig, 7
Casey 132, shows also, that even in a common law action,
evidence will be received to prove the true nature of the
transaction, when the deed and alleged defeasance are dated
apart from each other.

There, WOODWARD, J., submitted

the question of a sale or a security to the jury, and the judg-"
ment was affirmed. Harperv. Gubbings, 14 P. F. Sm. 315,
relied on by the appellee as ruling the case before us, is another proof of the practice to hear the circumstances of the
whole transaction where the deed and defeasance are not
simultaneous in date. In all the cases it will be seen that
the distinctive acts, as they are called in Brown v. Niccle,
wbicb characterize the transaction, have been treated as the
proper subjects of evidence, and not the mere understanding
of the parties, or their belief as to the legal effect of their
acts; and in all, the sum of the matter hag been to determine
by the true nature of the transaction, whether the conveyance was an actual sale, or a mode of securing money lent, or
a debt. The only exception is, where the instruments are of
even date on their face, and where, being in terms a conveyc
ance, and a contract to re-convey on payment of the money
passing between them, they are in legal contemplation a
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morigage. In that case, being a mortgage on their face, parol
evilence will not be received to convert them into a conditional sale.
"With these principles in mind, let us examine the facts before us. In doing this, it will be found that the error of tlhe
master was in treating the bill and answer as completely neutralizing each other, and disregarding all other evidence in
deciding upon the deed and agreement as instruments of
even date and creation, witnessing one and the same transaction on the same day, and thus falling within the principle
of Colwell v. 1loods, Eerr v. Gilmore, and some other cases.
But the' first paragraph of the plaintiff's bill sets forth a
strong, and in some respects, controlling fact admitted by the
answer to be true; that there was an agreement for the sale
of the property -to the defendant, upon which the very deed
in question was executed and dated May 31, 1858, and shortly
afterward tendered to the defendant. The only difference between the bill and answer upon this point is, that the former
alleges that Air. Thomson refused to accept it because the
price of the property was too high, while the latter asserts
that the tender was made to him when going to the cars on a
journey westward, followed by a protracted absence; and
that the refusal was only because the time and place afforded
no fitting opportunity for its examination. That the deed
was originally made and tendered on the footing of an actual
sale, is undeniable. Now, when we refer to the two instrumnents themselves, we find them dated widely apart-the deed
on the 31st of Mfay, 1858, and the agreement on the 10th of
Otober, 1859. On the face of the deed there is nothing in
date, recital or other circumstance to connect it with a traisaction a year and five months later, and it is only in the
agreement of October 10, 1859, at the foot we find a recital
that the deed of May, 1858, was delivered on the same day
with the agreement. In the absence of controlling facts, this
recital would establish their operation as a mortgage. The
recital of simultaneous delivery is, however, an admission of
that fact only, and does not account for the widely discrepant
dates and executions of the papers. This necessarily brings
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in the evidence to account for a fact on the face of the instruments themselves totally at variance with the idea of their
execution as contemporaneous parts of one transaction. This
evidence is furnished by the admissions of the parties themselves, corroborated by the date of the deed, that it was executed upon a sale, and not as security for money, and this is
the same deed which was finally delivered. Now, if a deed
of ong antecedent date, foundedupon an acknowledged sa2e, is
to be made to play a new part at a much later day-and to
take upon itseV the form of a defensible conveyance as a security for money lent or advanced, assuredly the burthen of
proof falls upon the party averring the change in its character
On this question -the bill and answer stand in direct contradiction to each other all the way through-the bill averring that
the sale became a-mortgage, and the answer expressly denying every fact and allegation set forth in .the bill. No attempt has been made to disprove the answer in these material
and positive denials, either by two witnesses, or by one witnessI and circumstances equivalent tothe testimony of a second,
but 'the case is rested by ihe plaintiff wholly on the agreement itself of October 10, 1859. Yet this paper is not in
form a defeasance, but an agreement to sell, and on its face
bears evidence tending to deprive it of the character"of a defeasance. In the first place, the consideration expressed in it
is not the same as that set forth in the deed, but a greater
one--that in the deed being $22,500, and that in the agreement, $24,030.75. This is not a strong circumstance, but it
shows discrepancy, rendering it somewhat probable that the
resale was for a greater sum than the sale. There is another
fact of more weight. The agreement binds Mr. Thomson to
convey to Mrs. Hanson only if the premises be not previously
sold. Thompson, it seems, interlined the words, "if not previously sold," as he says, to protect himself in his purchase.
The interlineation is conceded to be his. The plaintiff contends that this expresses only a power, and that the instrument was a defeasance with a power of sale to the mortgagee.
But this begs the question. If we assume that the deed is a
mortgage, the words in the defeasance, of course, import only
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a power of sale. But on the primary question whether it was a
sa/1 or a mortgage, the words interlined in connection with
the date of the deed, and the actual prior sale, strongly indicate a sale, and an intention to prevent a question as to ThomIt,
son's right to sell whenever and to whom he pleased.
therefore, discloses Thomson's intent to take the deed as it
was originally intended, as a purchase; and to preserve his
own control over the property. Having reached the point
that these instruments, together with the admitted facts
tend to repel the allegation that the deed admittedly made
upon a sale was afterward changed into a mortgage, we are
now at liberty to consider certain other facts and circumstances corroborating the answer of Mr. Thomson, and
strengthening the denial of the change into a mortgage. Hanson, the husband, is admitted to have been largely indebted
to Air. Thomson, and unable to pay his debts. In this situation the bill admits that his wife came forward to aid him
by the sale of the house and lot in question. The property
was not worth more than the price stipulated in the deed, to
wit--$22,500-subject to a mortgage of $7600, making $30,000.
The evidence of value taken would make it less valuable;
but leaving that out of sight, and taking the purchase itself
as Mr. Thomson's admission of value at that time, and the
assertion of the bill that he afterward declined to take the
property as being too high, it is very evident the price fixed
in the deed was the full value of the property. In connection with this fact, which in itself repels the idea of a mere
security for money, is the entire absence of any evidence of
an obligation to pay the debt. No covenant was taken in the
agreement; no bond or any other security for the re-payment
of the money. And to these circumstances we must add the
money advanced by Thomson to improve the property
which would be unsecured by the property, if it was to return to Mrs. Hanson as a mere mortgage. But if it were a
sale, Thomson, having reserved his right to sell, could sell,
repay his outlay, and render to Mrs. Hanson the sum stated
in the agreement. All these indicativefacts seem to be utterly irreconcilable with the fact of a mortgage, especially
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when we consider one of the grantors in the deed was a married woman, and the ofher an insolvent man. Upon the
whole ease we are forced to the conclusion that the deed was
not a mortgage, and.the subsequent agreement was a new resale brought about by the delays and difficulties, arising between the. parties, and forced upon Mr. Thomson in order to
close the sale, and also out of regard to the relation of Mrs.
Hanson as a wife, and the owner of the property, coming to
her husband's assistance, to enable her to regain it,"if she
could pay for it.
The decree is therefore reversed, and it is now adjudged
and decreed that the deed of May 31, 1858, is a grant of the
premises by way of a sale, and not a mortgage; and it is further decreed that the bill of the plaintiff be dismissed with
costs to be paid by the appellee.
Nothing is better settled than that
wherever a forfeitureis Incurred by the
non-payment of money, equity will restrain the creditor from enforcing the
penalty and from exacting more
than the amount of his debt with'interest. Law and equity both regard
interest as a compensation for the injury inflicted by delay in the payment
of a debt, and the statutes of most
countries regulate the amount of this
compensation, and forbid the creditor
to stipulateforanythinimore. Peachy
v. lWe Duke of Somerset, 3 Ld'g Cas. in
Eq. 895.
This principle of equity haslongbeen
applied to all cases where land is conveyed as security for the payment of
money; no matter what may be the
form of the pledge. The ordinary way
in which the pledge is created is by a
mortgage or conditional deed, which
conveys the title to the creditor, or to
a trustee for his benefit, on the express
condition that the conveyance shall be
void upon payment of the debt. But
the same result may be reached by
other means, and wherever the original
object or Intention of a conveyance of
land Is to secure to a creditor the payment of a debt, the effect is the same
so far as the operation of the principle

is concerned. Howardv. Harris,3 Ld'g
Cas. In Eq. 869, and notes.
.
The law does notregard theintention
of the parties further than to inquire
if the conveyance was meant as a security for the payment of money.
That original intent being established,
the conveyance becomes a mortgage,
and the parties cannot, by special agreement, alter the rules of law which govern such contract3. Williams v. Owen,
5 My. & Cr. 803. So that it cannot in
any way beprovided that the mortgagor shall lose his equity of redemption.
.unkle v. Wolfersberger. 6 Watts 126,
HUenry v. Davis, 7 Johns. Ch. 40. The
first question for the Court, then, in
cases of this kind, is to determine the
fact whether the conveyance was orig.
inally an absolute transfer, or only a
security for money. Any afterarrangement is to be carefully distinguished
from what passes at the time of the
original transaction. Meiley v. Thomp.
son, 7 Watts 401.
-Parolevidenceis admissible to explain
the real intention and purpose of the
parties at the time, though the convey.
ance be in form absolute; and even the
defeasance itself may be by parol,
Heisler v. Maderia,3 Watts & S,g. 388
Morris v. NVixon, 18 Howard 11; ''rong
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v. Stewart. 4 Johns. Ch. 167; Hamet v. XrNNEDY, J., in Kerrv. Gilmore supra;
.Dundas,4 i'arr178; 2bdd v. Campbell, Toddy. UCmpbell, 8 Casey 251.] The case
8 Casey 20; but a formal mortgage can above reported goes to this length, in
not be shown to be a conditional sale principle. The deed to Ir. Thomson
by the same means. In the one case, was not delivered (and was consequently
the proof raises an equity consistent no perfect deed) until the time when
with or superior to the writing, and in the agreement was also delivered, and
the other, would contradict it. The the two writings were clearly, in legal
reason given in the early eases for effect, contemporaneous. The ruling
the admissibility of parol evidence to in Kerr v. Gilmore seems, therefore,
vary the importof the deed, is that from to be shaken to that extent.
the relative helplessness of the borIn distinguishing a conditional sale
rower, it is likely that the lender aty from a mort6age, in cases where the
have omitted to cause tile deed is to be written evidence of the transaction is
so prepared as to represent the real in tile form of anabsolute conveyance
nature of the transaction. 2 Spence and an agreement to re-convey, certain
Eq. Jurls. 620.
circumstances have been stated in
It has been said that where the deed various cases as criteria, or rather, inand the separate defeasance are con- dicia, from which the Intention of the
temporaneous, they necessarily form parties may, with more or less certainty
one transaction, and constitute a mort- be determined: pointing either to the
gage, and, being a mortgage, parol tes- transfer of absolute ownership, or to
timony cannot be received to alter, ex- the creation of a security for the payplain or contradict the legal effect of ment of an existing debt or contempo.
the writings, Kerr v. Gilmore,6 Watts raneous loan:.
405; and where the defeasance Is in the
1. 2The suffiencyof thepricepaidto the
form of a condition, or otherwise grantor. Gross inadequacy of price is
shows beyond dispute that the con- strong evidence that a security only
veyance was meant only as a security, was intended.
Colwell v. Woods, 3
no doubt there would be no exception Watts 197; Sbreator v. Zones, 3 Hawks,
to the rule. But ina majority of the (N. C.) 423; 2enry v. Dars,7Johns. Ch.
cases of this kind which come before 40. Excessive inadequacy of price
the courts, the defeasance takes the would, of itself, furnisli irresistible
shape of an agreement to re-convey, or proof that a sale could not have been
giving to the seller the right to re-pur- contemplated.
Conway's Executor v.
chase upon specified terms. And It is AlexaYder, 7 Cranch 218.
easy to suppose a case where the first
2. Where there is an existing debt, and
contract between the parties should be the eridenwe of t, or the securities,are not
for an absolute sale, and theagreement delivered iq or cancelled,the conclusion
to re-convey clearly and distinctly a that the conveyance was given as sesubsequent transaction after the par- curity is alnost irresistible. .Rhines v.
ties were already firmly bound by their Baird, 5 Wright 264: Russell's Appeal
mutual contract to purchase and sell, 3 Harris322; but where a precedent
and yet the execution and delivery of debt is cancelled by the conveyance,
the (Iced be contemporaneous with the the inference is strong the other way,
agreement to re-convey. In such a and an agreement giving the debtor a
m .. 1lie effect of parol evidence to re- time to re-purchase, will not convert
but ;' - presumption that the two the deed into a mortgage. Robinson v.
writings constituted a mortgage would C0opsey, 2 Edw. Ch. 138.
be, not to alter or contradict the writ3. The absence of an obligation to repay
ings, but rather to sustain their plain the purchase-money. In Conu'tyv.Alexmeaning against a supposed presump. onder, 7 Cranch 218, Chief Justice MARtionof law. [See dissenting opinion of SHALL said: "The want of a covenant
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to repay themoney is not complete evi.. upon which an action may be maindeuce that a conditional sale was in. tained, without any written acknowltended; but is a circumstance of no edgment of it; but it has been held that,
inconsiderable importance. If theven - in the case of a mortgage, the covenant
dee must be restrained to his principal for the payment of the money must be
and interest, that principal and interest an express one, and no action will lie
ought to be secure. It is, therefore, a on the "proviso or condition in the
necessary ingredient in a mortgage, mortgage-deed. "No contract of borthat the mortgagee should have a reme- rowing or loan," says SEneweT, J.,
dy against the person of the debtor. If can be implied in law from the mortthis remedy really exists, its not being gage as the foundation of the action,
reserved in terms will not affect the when the contract betwee. the parties
case, But it must exist in order to justi- is express and formal. Expressum faci,
fy a construction which overrules the cessaretacitum." Scotv. Fields,7 Watts
express words of the instrument." And 361.
in Williams v. Owen, 5My. & Cr. 303, Lord
4. Where the grantee enters intoimmeCOTTENHAM said: "If the transaction diate possession and enjoyn,ent, under
was a mortgage, there must have been an absolute conveyance, it will not be
a debt; but how could Owen have com- easily presumed that the transaction
pelled payment?" But the later cases was a mortgage. E-ngland v. Cdring.
seem to have considered the absence of ton, 1 Eden 169; Wlliams
v. Owen--s.m
an obligation on the part of the grantor pra. But this is by no means
ccncluto pay, as of small importance, 3 Lead'g sive. Wilson v.
Shoenberger, 7 Cas. 299;
Cas. in Eq. (Am. Notes) 627-8, and cases Cox v. Cox,2 Casey 383. And where
there cited; and such is the current of
the grantee receives Interest; or, havdecision in Pennsylvania, Wharf. V. ing
taken possession, accounts for the
Howell, 5 -Binn. 499; Stver v. &cever,
rents, retaming the equivalent of in9 S. & R. 434; Jaques v. W eks, 7 Watts
terest, the character of his title can
268.
hardly be in doubt.
Of course, if there is an existing debt
k. C. 3L
the law presumes a promise to pay it

Supreme Judicial Court of New HamPshire.
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Where B seized A by the arm and swung him Violently around two or three
times, then letting him go, and A having thus been made dizzy, involuntarily
passed rapidly in the direction of and came violently against C, who instantly
pushed him away, and A then came in contact with a hook, and sustained an
injury; Held, that A might maintain trespass v! et armis against B.
There was no error in the following instructions to the jury: "That they
should inquire who was the first actor or the procuring cause of the injury to
A; that B would be liable if the wrongful force which he gave A carried him on
to the hook, or if such force, combined with the new force given to him by C,
produced the result; but if the jury should find that the injury received by A
resulted entirely from the push of C alone, unassisted by the act of B, then B
would not be liable; or in other words, if the original force given to A by B
bad ceased, or time was given to C for reflection and deliberation before he
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gave his push, then B would not be liable; that the jury should determine
,vhether the force, originally commenced by B, did at any time cease, and
whether it was not directly continued up to the time A struck the hook by the
direct agency of B, C lending his aid wittingly or unwittingly to the injury, or
whether C, by-pushing him from his person, did more than to act in selfdefense, and was not justified under the circumstances, in order to save his
person and himself from present danger; that the jury should determine, also,
whether, from the time A was irst seized by B and until the injury was done
he could exercise any self-control over his own person, or could in any way
have prevented what happened to him."
Where an injury is the result of two occurring causes, one party in fault isnot
exempted from full liability for the injury, although another party may he
equally culpable.

TRESPASS, by William N. Ricker against Edmund J. Freeman. The plaintiff's declaration alleged that "the said
Freeman, at etc., with force and arms made an assault upon
plaintiff, and beat, bruised, wounded, and ill-treated him, and
cast and threw him with great violence against and upon a
coat and hat hook, which penetrated the left side of the neck
of the plaintiff, severely wounding and lacerating the skin,
muscles and blood vessels, causing violent bleeding, great
pain, soreness, and swelling, insomuch that the plaintiff's life
was despaired of for a long space of time, viz., for the space
of two months; and in consequence of said wound, the plaintiff became greatly deformed, weakened and disabled in his
spine, neck, face, eyes and other parts of his head, and greatly
injured in his hearing, voice, and speech, all which continues
hitherto and is likely to be permanent; and also, plaintiff
was put to great expense for nursing and medical attendance
while laboring under the effects of said wounding, viz., the
sum of $200; and other injuries to the plaintiff the defendant then and there did, against the peace," etc.
The evidence in the case tended to show, that on the 18th
of October, A. D. 1868, the plaintiff was a pupil in the grammar school, kept in the lower part, of the school-house located
in the north part of the village of Dover; that he was then
some over thirteen years of age; and that the defendant then
attendedthe high school, kept in the second story of the same
house, at the same time, being then over sixteen years of age.
That there was a common entry way at the foot of tlestairs,
which communicated with the upper story, and from which

RICKER v. FREEMAN.

was the door that opened into the grammar school, and another down into the cellar. There was one common door
also, which allowed the scholars of both schools to pass from
the outside into the entry. Hooks of iron, for the purpose
of hanging up the coats and hats of the scholars, were located
around the easterly and northerly sides of this entry. These
hooks were fastened into cleats, which were made fast upon
the sides of the building. Plaintiff's testimony tended to
show, that in the afternoon of the aforesaid day he went alone
to school,. and as he came into the school-house yard he
saw the defendant standing in the entry, looking out from
the north side of the entry door, and that he dodged back
out of sight and as the plaintiff stepped into, the door, the
defendant caught him by the right arm or wrist, with both
of his hands, and swung him violently round two or three
times. "This made me dizzy. He let me go, and I passed
off in a north-easterly direction and came violently against
.the Townsend boy, and Townsend pushed me off. Whendefendant was whirling me round, sometimes my feet were not
on the floor, and sometimes they were. When Townsend
pushed me off, I went against the hat hook. It entered under my left ear," etc.
The jury found for plaintiff, whereupon defendant moved
to set the verdict aside.
Wheeler for the motion.
Christie for plaintiff, contra.
FOSTER, J.-Various exceptions were taken at the trial
with regard to the allcwance of certain amendments and the
admission of certain evidence, which, not beinginsisted upon in
argument, may be regarded as abandoned. Without adverting to them in detail, we may remark that none of them are
in our opinion tenable; and subsequent reflection and examination of the exceptions by the defendant's counsel have
probably led him to the same conclusion.
The first objection that is now insisted upon relates to the form
of the action. In all cases where the injury is done with force
and immediately by the act of the defendant, trespass may be
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maintained ; and where the injury is attributable to negligence,
although it were the immediate effect of the defendant's act,
the party injured has an election either to treat the negligence of the defendant as the cause of action, and declare in
case, or to consider the act itself as the cause of the injury,
and to declare in trespass: Daltonv. Favour,3 N. H. 466; Blin
v. Campbell, 14 Johns. 432.
Mr. Greenleaf, 2 Evid. § 224, says: "The distinction
between the actions of trespass vi et armis and trespass on
the case is clear, though somewhat refined and subtle. By
the former, redress is sought for an injury accompanied with
actual force; by the latter, it is sought for a wrong without
force. The criterion of trespass vi et armis is force directly
applied, or vis proxima. If the proximate cause of the injury
is but a continuation of the original force, or vis impressa,the
effect is immediate, and the appropriate remedy is trespass vi
et armis. But if the original force, or vis imlressa, had

ceased to act before the injury commenced, the effect is mediate, and the appropriate remedy is trespass on the case."
And see 1 Hilliard on Torts 97, 105.
Wherever an act is unlawful at first, trespass will lie for
the consequences of it. Reynolds v. Clarke, Strange 634.
falus animus is not necessary to constitute a trespass.

"The defendant was uncocking a gun, and the plaintiff standing, to see it: it went off and wounded him; and at the trial
it was held that the plaintiff might maintain trespass." Underwood v. Hfewson, Strange 596.

In Weaver v. Ward, Hobart 134, it is said, "no man shall
be excused of a trespass except it may be judged utterly
without his fault." And in Scott v. Shepherd, 2 W. Black.
892, it is said, "the natural and probable consequence of the
act done by the defendant was injury to somebody, and
therefore the act was illegal at common law. Being therefore
unlawful, the defendant was liable to answer for the consequences, be the injury mediate or immediate ;" and trespass
was held to lie in that case. And see Jordan v. Myatt, 4 Gxat.
151.
But whether the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the ac' be
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the criterion, it is not necessary to determine in this case.
Probably it would not be so regarded; though the opinions
of learned judges are somewhat at variance upon this point
(see Scott v. Shepherd, 1 Smith's L. 0.212; Reynolds v. Clarke,
Strange 635; 1 Hilliard on Torts 107), because, in the present
case, although no malice is attributed to the defendant, still
there can be no denial that his interference with the plaintiff;
with force and arms, was an unlatpful assault, and, although
the ultimate effect and injury may not be regarded as the
inevitable result of the original unlawful act, still, if the result
was a consequence of that act, the plaintiff is entitled to maintain trespass. 1 Chitty Pl. 125-130; Cole v. Fisher,11 Mass.
137; Smith v. Rutherford, 2 Serg. & Rawle 358; M'Allister
v. Hammond, 6 Cow. 342; Codman v. Evans, 7 Allen 433;
Murphy v. N. Y. & N. H. B. R., 30 Conn. 187.
But if the appropriateness of the remedy chosen by the
plaintiff were not, as we think it is, free from doubt, we
should nevertheless be inclined to sustain the action if substantial justic6 should seem to require it, on the principle
stated in Slater v. Baker, 2 Wils. 359, where it is said: "The
court will not, after verdict, look with eagle eyes to see
whether the evidence applies exactly or not to the case; but
if the plaintiff has obtained a verdict for such damages as he
deserves, they will establish it if possible."
We would not encourage looseness in pleading, and would
always endeavor to avoid the confusion which must inevitably result from throwing down the boundaries of actions;
but the refined though perhaps clear distinction between the
actions of trespass and case should not be strenuously regarded, if injustice would result thereby. "The distinction,"
says Mr. Perkins, in his notes to Chitty 126, "between trespass and case is in effect broken down in Massachusetts," and
it is abolished in Maine by statute. Rev. Stat., ch. 82, § 13.
The more important inquiry relates to the charge and instructions of the court to the jury.
They were directed to inquire who was the firist actor or
the procuring cause of the injury to the plaintiff. They were
told that the defendant would be liable if the wrongful force
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which lie gave the plaintiff carried him on to the hook, or if
such force, combined with the new force given to him by
Townsend, produced the result. But if they should find that
the injury received by the plaintiff resulted entirely from the
push of Townsend alone, unassisted by the act of the defendant, then he would not be liable; or, in other words, if
the original for~e given to the plaintiff by the defendant had
ceased, or time was given to Townsend for reflection or deliberation before he gave his push, then the defendant would
not be liable. The jury would determine whether the force
originally commenced by the defendant did at any time
cease, and whether it was not directly continued up to the
time the plaintiff struck the hook, by the direct agency of
the defendant, Townsend lending his aid wittingly or unwittingly to the injury; or whether Tbwnsend, by pushing him
from his person, did more than to act in self-defense, and was
not justified under the circumstances in order to save his
person and himself from present danger. The jury would
determine also whether, from the time the plaintiff was first
seized by the defendant and until the injury was done, he
could exercise any self-control over his own person, or could
in any way have prevented what happened to him.
The substance of these instructions, so far as the defendant's exceptions render them material to this inquiry, is, that.
if the force or impetus given to the plaintiff by the defendant,
when he seized, whirled and slung him away, continued in
operation, either alone or in combination with the force or
impetus, if any, communicated by Townsend, until this force
or impetus impaled the plaintiff upon the hook, and so the
defendant, either solely or in conjunction with Townsend, inflicted the injury, such injury was the direct and proximate
result of the defendant's original wrongful-act, and he must
be answerable for the consequences.
It is quite clear that but for the defendant's wrongful act,
the plaintiff would have sustained no injury. It is equally
clear that, under the instructions of the court, the jury must
have found, in order to charge the defendant, that the original
force or impetus given to the plaintiff had not ceased, and
Vor. XX.-45.
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that time was not given Townsend for reflection or deliberation before he pushed the plaintiff off, and that Townsend,
either in self-defense or in obedience to an uncontrollable impulse and instinct, became the involuntary means of continuing
the original force and impetus which cast the plaintiff upon
the hook. They must also hava found that, after the first
assault by the defendant, the plaintiff was incapable of exercising self-control or preventing the result.
We have seen that malice is not essential to the iaintenance of trespass for an assault, but that the action is supported by a negligent act and pure accident, if the negligent
or accidental act is also a wrongful act. And we think the
principle is clearly established, that negligence may be regarded as the proximate cause of an injury, of which it may
not be the sole nor the immediate cause. If the defendant's
negligent, inconsiderate and wanton, though not malicious
act, concurred with any other thing, person or event, other
than the plaintiff's own fault, to prodace the injury, so that
it clearly appears that, but.for such negligent, wrongful act,
the injury would not have happened, and both ircumgtances
are closely connected with the injury in the order of events,
the defendant is responsible, even though his negligent,
wrongful act may not have been the nearest cause in the chain
of events or the order of time. Shearman & Redfield on
Negligence, § 10, and cases cited in note.
In trespass for an assault, it cannot be essential that the
defendant should personally touch the plaintiff; if he does it
by some intermediate agency, it is sufficient. The intermediate concurring act will not purge the original torti nor take
assignment of the responsibility.
In Jordan v. Wyatt, 4 Grattan 151, BALDwIN, J., says:
"The terms 'immediate' and 'consequential' should, as I
conceive, be understood, not in reference to the time which
the act occupies, or the space through which it passes, or the
place from which it is begun, or the intention with which it
is done, or the instrument or agent employed, or the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the act, but in reference to the progress and termination of the act-to its being done on the
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one hand, and its having been done on the other. If the
injury is inflicted by the act at any moment of its progress
from the commencement to the termination thereof, then the
injury is direct or immediate; but if it arises after the act
has been completed, though occasioned by the act, then it is
consequential or collateral, or, more exactly, a collateral consequence."
The defendant objects particularly to that part of the
charge in which the jury were toid that "if the original force
given by Freeman had ceased, or time was given Townsend
for reflection or deliberation beform he gave the push, then
Freeman would not be liable." And he contends that, under
these instruction- the jury must have found either that
Townsend's force combined with the original impetus given
by the defendant, or that Townsend did not have time for
reflection and deliberation before he gave the push; that the
jury might have decided the case upon the latter considera.
tion, which, he says, would be wrong, because Townsend was
bound to reflect and deliberate, The force projected by the
defendant having ceased, as he contends, the new force given
by Townsend was original, because not demanded for the selfdefense of Townsend; that the plaintiff, not being a dangerous
missile or instrument, like the famous squib in Scott v. Shuephzerd, Townsend had no right to push him off; and if he did
so, to the plaintiff's injury, the result cannot be considered
the proximate or immediate act of the defendant, and so he
is not answerable.
If it be suggested that human nature instinctivety repels the
forcible contact of a person or thing thrown or falling against
a person, the defendant replies that the person thus assailed
must control that impulse, and must take time for reflection
and deliberation before he can act; or at any rate, if he does
not, the projector of the original force is exonerated, because
the original force has ceased and stopped. We think this
proposition is altogether too refined.
A man instinctively repels violent contact with a foreign
and external substance. He can no more control the impulse
to ward off and repl a suddeu and unlooked-for blow, than
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an unreasoning, inanimate, but elastic substance can control,
by superior power of gravity, the natural repulsion and rebound of the thing thrown or falling violently upon or against
it; and it can hardly be said that the original force has ceased
or stopped at all, during the inconceivably sharp point of
time interposed between the contact and the repulsion of a
blow striking an inanimate elastic object, or an object animate, sentient, but also involuntarily repellant.
The substance of the charge in this particular was,-that if
Townsend instinctively pushed off the plaintiff Townsend's
push was the defendant's act. This was correct. The act
of Townsend was the direct and inevitable consequence of
the defendant's act. The defendant set in motion the train
of causes which led directly to the unfortunate result. In
the language of DEGREY, C. J., in Scott v. Shepherd,. "I look
upon all that was done subsequent to the original throwing,
as a continuation of the first force and first act. The new
direction and new force flow out of the first force, and are
not a new.trespass."
The act of Townsend is involuntary. Committing' no voluntary wrong,*he is but a link in the chain of causes of
injury of which the defendant is the wrongful author. A
man pushes another against a board, which, springing, repels
the contact with the man, and throws the latter against a rock
or upon the ground. It is the act and fault of the original
assailant and not of the board. The man and not the board
is liable. The result in law is the same whether the intermediate concurring object is a board or a boy, if the boy has
no more volition than the board.
The defendant is to be regarded as "one who negligently
sets mechanical forces in operation beyond his power to stop
or safely direct, or as one who carelessly-puts destructive implements or mafirials in situations where they are likely to
produce mi chief." Underhill v. Manchester,45 N. H. 218.
The natural, innocent impulse of Townsend in this case is
a natural force in Townsend, set in motion by the defendant,
and in no essential particular differs from the natural forces
of the material world. Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. 381.
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It was not necessary, therefore, as we regard it, that the.
jurx should have comne to the conclusion that Townsend
pt-hIed off the plaintiff in self-defense. They might have
done so, upon the evidence; and upon such finding the defendant would clearly be liable. Such a condition of things
would bring the case precisely within the doctrine of Scott v.
Slhepherd, and within the principle declared by GOULD, J.,
when lie says: "I think the defendant may be considered in
the same view as if lie himself had personally tlrou-n the
squil) in the plaintiff's thee. The terror impressed on Willis
and Ryal excited self-defense, and deprived them of the
power of recollection. What they did was therefore theinevitable consequence of the defendant's unlawful act. What
Willis did was by necessity, and the defendant imposed that
necessity upon him."
There is still another aspect of the case, in which, if it
were possible to regard Townsend as contributing to the unfortunate injury of the plaintiff by his own negligence and
careless warding off the person of the plaintiff; the result
would still be not more favorable for this defendant. Though
a third person's negligence mav have contributed to the result,
so that such third person might even be liable to answer in
damages, still the original author of the mischief will not
any the more be excused.
In Chapman v. The N w Haven R?. B. Co., 19 X. Y. 341
an action was sustained against the defendant for an injury
occasioned to the plaintiff by a collision between a train of
cars upon its road and' one upon the Iarlem railroad, and
which would not have occurred but from the negligence of
the latter road, in the cars of which the plaintiff was a passenger; thus, in effect, holdiiigthat where the injury was the
result of two concurring canses, one party in fault is not exenipted from full liability for the injury, although another party
was equally culpable.
And in Peck v. -real, 3 McLean 22, the driver of a coacl
was considered liable to the plaintiff for an accident happening through his negligence, although the negli:1,:c of the
driver of the coach in which the 1laintilf sat contributed to
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the accident, and although, it was said, an action might lie
against the latter.
And ee Brehm v. The Great Western Railway, 34 Barb.
274, and Mott v. The Hudson River R 1R., 8 Bosw. 345. In
the latter case, the plaintiff's buildings were on fire; and
while the firemen were eudeavoring to'extinguish it, the cars
of the defendant passed over the hose, cutting and rendering
it unfit for use, in consequence of which the buildings were
consumed. It was held; that if the act were done by the
concurring negligence of the defendant and the fireinen, in
such sense that the hose would not have been cut if either
had been free from negligence, the plaintiff was entitled to
recover.
Upon all these considerations, we are of the opinion that
there was no error in the instructions 6f the- court, and
that the plaintiff may maintain trespass for the injury which
he has sustained.

Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire.
RAY v. ADDEN.
A husband is not liable to an attorney for professional services rendered his
wife in defending a libel for divorce by the husband against her upon the
ground of adultery, even though such defense may prove successful.

ASSUmPSiT, by Ossian Ray against Edward F. Adden, for
professional services rendered defendant's wife at her request.
Defendant commenced a libel for divorce against his wife, for
the alleged cause of adultery, which was entered in court
at July term, 1866, for Coos county, and continued from term
to term until the March adjourned term, 1870, when, upon
hearing, said libel was dismissed without prejudice. At the
July term, 1867, on application of the libellee, an allowance
of thirty dollars was granted her by the court to aid her in
defending said libel, which was paid by the defendant. Plaintiff claims and offers to prove that from the time of filing said
libel, said defendant's wife has been and is destitute of property and unable to pay her counsel, who has received nothing
toward his services and advances, except said thirty dollars.
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The services of counsel were necessary in defending the libel,
and plaintiff's claim is wholly for such services and advances.
The dctcndent never employed the plaintiff, nor agreed to
pa'y said claim; but the plaintiff contends that defendant is
bound to pay the same as for necessaries for his wife.
It was agreed that after the opinion of the court should
be obtained on the foregoing case, it might be discharged
and tried by the jury if either party so elect.
Questions of law reserved for the whole court.
Ray & Ladd, for plaintiff.
Fletcher, Heywood & Crawford, for defendant.
J. The liability of the husband upon the contracts of his wife must rest either upon the ground of his
assent, or approval of the same, or because the law of marriage has imposed upon him the duty of supplying her with
necessaries during the marriage, until she has relinquished
or forfeited a right to claim them, by her own voluntary act,
misconduct, or crime.
The case finds that here was no promise or assent on the
part of the husband to pay this plaintiff, and this claim is put
upon tho ground of necessaries.
That the husband is liable for necessaries thus furnished
to the wife, such as necessary food, drink, clothing, washing,
physic, instruction, and a suitable ilaee of residence, with
such necessary furniture as is suitable to her condition, there
is no doubt. W'hittingtiam v. Hill, Oroke Jac. 494; Hunt v.
DeBlaqdere, 5 Bing. 550; 2 Smith's L. Gas. 364; Aforrisonv.
Holt, 42 N. 1T. 478.
It is also held in Sklepard v. Alfackoul, 3 Camp. 326, where
the wife exhibited articles of the peace against her husband,
and employed an attorney to assist her,. that the husband
would be liable to such attorney for such services, provided
such measures were necessary. If the conduct of the husband was such that she must necessarily resort to such
measures in order to preserve life and health--to protect herself from imminent danger to life or limb or health'-then
SARGENT,

I See HarrIsv Lee 1 Peere Wnq. 4;2-i3. fora marked illustration of the rule
In Equity; see also .farlow v. .Pifleld, id., 59.
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the necessity existed. To the same effect are A"7elton v. Pendieton, 18 Conn. 417; Morris v. Palmer, 39 N. H. 123;
Smith v. Davis, 45 N. H. 566-70, and cases cited.
In this case the husband applied for the divorce on the
ground of the adultery of the wife. She opposed the granting of the divorce, and employed plaintiff, who rendered her
the necessary aid in making her defense; and the case finds
that he so far succeeded in the defense as to procure the libel
to be dismissed without prejudice.
This entry "dismissed without prejudice," indicates that
the libel was not dismissed upon the merits of the case, upon
the ground that theevidence showed thelibellee to be innocent
of the charge made against her, but for some insufficiency
in the allegations, or in the service of the libel (see rule 4,
June adjourned term, 1865), where it might be proper to
allow the libellant to bring a new libel for the same cause.
This would not be done in any case where the evidence
showed. the libellee to be free from fault and from suspicion.
Therefore the fact of this entry shows that the libellant failed
upon some technical point in the case, rather than that the
libellee succeeded in proving her innocence of the charge
made against her.
But however that may be, it would certainly be a new discovery if the attoriey for the libellee has a valid claim
against the husband for the services thus rendered the wife.
The court has long been in the habit of granting aid to the
libellee in such cases, when they apply and furnish the proper evidence, by way of interlocutory order, by making an
allowance to the wife to aid her in making a defense. When
the wife is the libellant, it is not customary to make her any
allowance in that way, but to consider the matter of her necessary expenses, in awarding alimony.'
But when the wife is libellee, such allowances are made,
and the husband is ordered to pay to his wife some reasonable sum to assist her in making defense. This has been
done, because it was supposed to be the only way in which
the husband could be compelled to defray the wife's necessary
1 See 49 X. EL 7 (reporter's note) as to manuscript opinion by GILcORisT C. J
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expenses; neither party by our practice recovers costs in a
divorce case. But no interlocutory order in such a case
could be necessary, if the husband is liable to the attorney of
the wife for all such services as he may render. The order
which the court made in this case was a work of supererogation. The libellee's counsel might as well recover the -whole
in one suit, as to obtain an order of court for part, and be
obliged to sue for the residue.
One thing is very certain, that the court never understood
that the counsel could recover for his services against the
husband of the libellee in such a case, else'they would not
have been making orders of allowance to the libellee to enable her to make her defense. She could make such defense
without such aid if she could charge her husband with the
whole expense of her defense. We think the authorities
fully justify the court in the views they have taken, and are
decisive to the point that the plaintiff in this case cannot recover. The reasoning in Horrisonv. Holt, 42 N. H. 478, where
it was held that the husbaid was not liable to the wife's
counsel for services rendered her in obtaining a divorce from
her husband on the ground of his adultery, is much of it
equally applicable here. To the same point is Johnson v.
Tilliams, 3 Iowa 97, and Shelton v. Pendleton, 18 Conn. 417.
And in Bishop on Mfar. and Div., sec. 571, it is said that
the husband is not "liable to the legal adviser whom she (the
wife) may employ, either in prosecuting or defending a divorce suit." The reason stated is, that she cannot bind her
husband for anything unless it be necessary for her safety;
and he adds "But it is very necessary for her safety, as 2ife,
either to obtain a divorce from him, or to resist his obtaining
one from her."
And in Coffin v. Dunham, 8 Gush. 404, it is expressly held
that a husband is not liable for services rendered to his wife
by a counselor at law, in successfully defending her against a
libel for divorce filed against her by her husband. This
would seem to be directly in point; and so is ITing v. Irlburt, 15 Vt. 607. It seems that llurlburt and his wife had
filed cross libels for divorce, and that Wing had been coun-
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sel for the wife in both cases, and made his charges in the
case in which she was libellant, and also in the case in which
she was libellee, and sued the husband for both these classes
of items. WILLIAMS, 0. J., in the opinion, says: " But to dissolve the bond of matrimony between them on her request, or
to resist his petition for that purpose, cannot he considered as
necessary for her safety or preservation, so as to enable her to
procure professional assistance therefor on his credit and at his
cost." "No case," he says, "is found where this was ever attempted."
But in this Stdte both have now been attempted-the one
in 24orrisonv. Holt, 42 N. H. supra, and the other in this
case; and our judgment is that, as in the former case so in
the latter, the attempt must fail.
Unless the case is discharged according to its terms, there
must be
Judgment for the defendant.

United States District Court. District of Kansas. In
Bankruptcy.
MATTER OF J. R. STILWELL.
A creditor who has a mortgage on a bankrupt's homestead, as security for
his debt, may prove his debt and vote for an assignee.

The question is fully stated in the opinion of the court,
which was delivered by
DELAHAY, J.-The question submitted to the court in this
case is, whether a creditor having a mortgage upon the homestead of the bankrupt, to secure his demand, has the right
to prove his demand and vote on the choice of an assignee
of the bankrupt's estate.
The 13th section of the bankrupt law provides who may
legally vote for an assignee in the following language, to wit :
"The choice to be made by the greater part in value and in
number of the creditors who have proved their debts."
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The 22d section of the same law provides as follows, to
wit: "To entitle a claimant against the estate of a bankrupt
to have his demand allowed, it must be verified by a deposition
in writing, on oath, or solemn affirmation before the proper
register or commissioner, setting forthThe demand;
The consideration thereof;
Whether any and what securities are held therefor, etc.,"
evidently contemplating that all demands, whether secured
or otherwise, shall be proven in the manner indicated in said
22d section.
If these two sections were alone to be considered there
would be no difficulty in deciding this question, since the
13th section of the law provides that all who have proved
their demands may vote, and the 22d section provides that
all creditors with, as well as without, security may prove their
demands. But the 20th section has apparently placed a limitation on this right which must be next considered. The
language of said section, so far as it relates to this question
is as follows:
"Where a creditor has a mortgage or pledge of real or
personal property of the bankrupt, or a lien thereon for
securing the payment of a debt owing to him from the bankrupt, he shallbe admitted as a creditor only for the balance of
the debt, after deducting the value of such property, to be
ascertained by agreement between him and the assignee, or
by a sale thereof to be made in such manner as the court
shall direct."
In Bump's Law and Practice of Bankruptcy is made this
broad declaration: "A secured creditor cannot vote," (see
4th ed. page 123.) This statement is much broader than
the law will sustain, for unquestiouably, a creditor who has
an endorser for security, or who holds a mortgage on other
than the bankrupt's property, is not prohibited from voting,
for by the terms of the law only such as have liens upon the
property of the bankrupt are prohibited from being admitted
as creditors. To sustain his statement he cites three cases,
one of which does not discuss this question and the other
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two do not agree, one being on each side of the question,
thus, in effect, leaving it open and unsettled. The attorneys
in this ease seem to have accepted qualifiedly Mr. Bump's
statement and have failed to discuss the point as to what is
the true construction to be given to the 20th sec. quoted
-above. I am unable to see in what manner the fact that the
mortgage is upon the homestead, rather than any other piece
of the bankrupt's property, can alter the construction to be
given to the 20th section of this law.
But it seems there is a distinction between proving a
caicim or debt and being admitted a creditor, in this, that the
proof of a debt is the preliminary step only toward the admission to the rank of a creditor, under this law. A debt
may be proven while the judicial act of admitting or allowing the claim may be entirely omitted, or the claim may be
rejected. The language used in the 13th see., to wit., ."have
proved their debts," evidently refers to and intends only the
deposition indicated in the 22d see., and does not intend and
mean that there shall be a judgment final, such as is implied
in the 20th see., when it uses the words admitted a creditor,
which carries with it the idea of an adjudication, after proof
offered.
It is not difficult to imagine a case where every creditor
could have some lien such as would comae within the provisions of the 20th see., and if no one such creditor could
vote for an assignee, as contended for by the attorneys for
the objecting creditors in this case, it might be questionable
whether any assignee could legally be appointed, because
there might be opposing interests from such prospective
creditors, and the law fails to provide that such interest shall
proceed only from creditors who have "proved their debts."
I am of the opinion, therefore, that the register did right
in allowing the mortgagee to vote on the election of an assignee.
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United States Circuit Court, District of Afinnesota.
THE STATE OF WISCONSIN V. THE CITY OF DULUTH et al.
The Circuit Courts of the United States have no jurisdiction of an action in
which a State is plaintiff.
By the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court has original
Jurisdiction in such cases, and noconcurrent jurisdiction hasbeen conferred by
Congress on the Circuit Courts.
Whether Congress could confer a concurrent jurisdiction in such cases on the
Circuit Court: Quaerc.

This was a bill in equity, filed by the State of Wisconsin,
asserting the interest of the State, and of her citizens, in the
navigation of the river St. Louis, from its mouth, where it
empties into Lake Superior, at Superior City, for about twenty
miles up the river, a part of which, by reason of the expansion of the river, is known as the Bay of Superior, and alleging that the City of Duluth, and Mr. Luce, the mayor of that
city, and the Northern Pacific Railroad Co., are now
extending a dyke into the navigable waters of said river,
whereby the use of the river for navigation will be seriously
obstructed, and the rights of the State and of her citizens,
will be impaired. The bill prayed for an injunction, and
other relief.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILLER, J.The case comes before us at this time for a
preliminary injunction, and the defendants raise the question
of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, and move to dismiss
the bill on that ground.
The question thus presented is, whether a State of the
Union can maintain a suit in a Circuit Court of the United
States. It is one of interest and of great importance. As we
shall presently see, it does not appear to have ever been decidedi by the Supreme Court, and has only received the attention of the Circuit Courts in two or three reported cases.
It is not asserted in behalf of plaintiff that the jurisdiction
can be maintained on the nature of the rights asserted in the
bill without regard to the character of the parties, bitt it is
insisted that, as one of the States of the Federal Union, Wisconsin can sustain any action which can properly be brought
in a Circuit Court.
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The Constitution, in the second section of the third article,
declares that the judicial power shall extend to controversies
between a State and citizens of another State, and as the defendant, Luce, and the City of Duluth are undeniably citizens
of the State of Minnesota, the case in that respect comes
within that provision of the fundamental law.
The succeeding clause, however, of the same section, in defining the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the only court
established by the Constitution, uses language which cannot
be disregarded in this connection. It says that in all cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
and those in which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Court
shall have original jurisdiction. In all other cases before
mentioned, it shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law
and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as
the Congress shall make.
As this is a case in which a State is a party, the Supreme
Court undoubtedly has original jurisdiction of it, if it is one
to which the power of the Federal judiciary extends; and this
jurisdiction it has without the aid of any Act of Congress;
for it is conferred in clear and express terms by the Constitution. Nor is this affected by the eleventh amendment to the
Constitution; for that only protects the States from suits commenced or prosecuted against them, when brought by citizens
of another State, or of a foreign State. It may, therefore, be
safely affirmed that the Supreme Court would have jurisdic,
tion of this suit so far as the character of the parties can give
it, if brought in that court: Pennsylvaniav. The Wheeling
.Bridge Company, 13 How. 518.
As that court has original jurisdiction of such suits, it
would seem that it cannot'have in any such case appellate
jurisdiction. The section in the Constitution which confers
it as original is followed by the declaration that in all other
cases before mentioned the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction. Did the framers of the Constitution intend
to give to the Supreme Court both an original and appellate
jurisdiction in the same class of cases founded in the character
of the parties? Or did it by this clause intend to define the
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cases in which it should have original, and those in which it
should have appellate jurisdiction, and to distinguish and
separate them from each other?
The natural import of the language used, defining specially
the cases in which it has original jurisdiction, and declaring
that in all others its jurisdiction shall be appellate, favors
very strongly the idea that in those classes of cases of which it
has original cognizance it can have no appellate jurisdiction.
If this be a sound exposition of the Constitution, it follows
that if there is in the Circuit Court a jurisdiction concurrent
with the Supreme Court in eases to which a State is a party,
no appeal or writ of error can be taken when the suit is
brought in the former. This would be an anomaly in our
system of jurisprudence, which stands alone, and it weighs
very heavily against a construction of the act of Congress
creating the Circuit Courts, and conferring their powers,
which brings such cases within their jurisdiction by mere implication.
But waiving this view of the subject for the present, these
propositions may be fairly deduced from the Constitution in
regard to suits brought by a State against citizens of another State.
1. That the judiciary power of the Federal government extends to such cases.
2. That the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction of
such cases.
3. That jurisdiction is conferred on no other court of
such cases by the Constitution proqpria vigore.
Conceding, then, that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
as derived from the Constitution is not exclusive in this class
of cases, we must still look, to some other source of authority
than that instrument when a concurrent jurisdiction is claimed
for some other court. It may also be conceded, and perhaps
that is the established doctrine, that the States have lawfully
conferred such a power on their own courts when exercised
on person or property within their territorial limits, and that
to this extent such a concurrent jurisdiction exists.
But when it is claimed for any other Federal court than the

WISCONSIN v. DULUTH.

Supreme Court, the power must be found in an act of Congress.
It is a proposition which admits of no further debate, and
needs the citation of no authorities at this day, that all courts
of the United States, except the Supreme Court, being the
mere creatures of Congressional statute, can exercise no jurisdiction but such as is given by those statutes; and even the
Supreme is limited in all except the original jurisdiction
given it by the Constitution-a very small portion, indeed,
of the power which it exercises-by the will of Congress as
expressed in its legislation.
We turn, then, to the Act of 1789, establishing the judiciary system of the United States, to which alone we can look
for the requisite authority ; for though there are many subsequent statutes conferring jurisdiction on the Federal courts,
there are none which can affect the question before us.
The fourth section of that Act creates the Circuii Courts,
and the eleventh defines their powers, and confers their jurisdiction. The latter declares that they shall have original
cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States
of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity where
the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or
value of five hundred dollars, and the United States areplaintiffs, or petitioner, or an alien is a party, or the suit is between a
citizen of the State where the suit is brought and a citizen of another State.
This is all that is to be found in this section conferring
jurisdiction on the ground of the character of the parties,
and we look here in vain for any jurisdiction where a State
is a party. I do not know if the idea has ever been advanced
that a State is a mere aggregation of: its own citizens, and
therefore has the same right to bring suit that any one of its
citizens has.
It has not been asserted by counsel in the case before us.
It certainly cannot be maintained upon any sound view of
the Constitution. If the word State is used in that sense in
the constitutional provision it is useless, because there is the
provision that the judicial power extends to controversies
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between citizens of different States, and if a State is but the
aggregate of its citizens, then the other is unnecessary.
The clause in that instrument conferring original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court in cases where a State is a party,
certainly does not confer jurisdiction when citizens of different States are parties.
In view, then, of the constitutional foundation on which
alone a State can be a party in the Federal courts, no such
construction of the statute defining the jurisdiction of the
Circuit Court can be sound.
A like conclusion results from an examination of the
thirteenth section of the Judiciary Act. It declares that the
Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a civil nature where a State is a party, except
between a State and its citizens, and except, also, between a
State and citizens of other States, or aliens, in which latter
case it shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction.
Now, in all these cases Congress makes a very clear distinction between a State and its citizens, and it denies to the Supreme Court any original jurisdiction between a State and its
own citizens, and confers on it jurisdiction original but not
exclusive, as between a State and citizens of other States.
This latter is the precise class of cases to which the one before us belongs; and it would be a violation of all sound
rules of construction to say that the same jurisdiction exactly
is conferred on the Circuit Court, by using the phrase, "controversies between citizens of different States "-a phrase applied both in this statute and in the Constitution to a very
different class of controversies than the one under considera.
tion.

This precise question was raised in the case of Osborne v.
The Bank of the United States, 9 Wheaton 841, in which the
jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution, where a State is a
party, is held to apply only where a State in its corporate or
sovereign character is by name an actual party to the record.
It is argued, however, that inasmuch as the Constitution
in conferring original jurisdiction in this class of cases on tlie
Supreme Court, did not make that jurisdiction exclusive, and
or. XX.-45
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the thirteenth section of the Act of 1.789 declares expressly
that it shall not be exclusive, that the concurrent jurisdiction which is thus implied to be or remain in some other
court must be in the Circuit Court. It would be a sufficient
answer to this to say that if it must necessarily be in a court
of the United States, it might as well be sought in the Dis.
trict Court as in the Circuit Court, for there is nothing in the
statute defining the juiisdiction of either of those courts
which refers to this jurisdiction even by implication.
But even if the language of the thirteenth section of -the
Judiciary Act does imply a concurrent jurisdiction in some
other court, we have already seen that such a jurisdiction exists now, and has always probably existed in the State courts.
And the probability that it was to this that the thirteenth
section had reference is the stronger, because in many other
cases that statute recognizes both in express terms, and by
fair implication, such a concurrent power in the State courts
with those of the United States. Such is the case with the
great body of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts in regard
to aliens, citizens of different States, and suits brought by the
United States. So also of Admiralty Courts, where the common law furnishes a remedy and other grounds of jurisdic.
tion of the District Courts mentioned in the ninth section of
the same statute.
There is every reason, therefore, to infer that Congress, in
declaring that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in this class of cases shall not be exclusive, had reference to
the jurisdiction over the same class of cases intended to be
left with the State courts, and. which we have already seen,
they have uniformly and constantly exercised without objection.
But if Congress can confer on the Circuit Courts an original jurisdiction in this class of cases, concurrent with that of
the Supreme Court, it is a sufficient answer to say that it has
not done so. And in the face of the fact that Congress has
not in any other instance whatever during a period of over
eighty years that the government has existed, attempted to
confer on those two courts a concurrent jurisdiction, is an ar-
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gument of great force against implying such exercise of the
power, in the absence of words expressly granting it. It
would indeed be curious if, when the Constitution which gave
so limited an original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court,
made a suit btought by a State against citizens of another
State, one of that limited number, Congress had conferred
the same jurisdiction on an inferior tribunal without an appeal to the former.
Looking at the question which we are considering, as it
may be afficted by the authority of judicial decisions, we
have been unable to find, with the iimited opportunity which
the exigency of this case gives for an investigation, any case
in which it has been decided that such jurisdiction exists in
the Circuit Court.
Some reference is made to the remarks of the Supreme
Court, and in the dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice, in
the Wheeling Bridge Case, 13 How. 18, which are supposed
to favor such a doctrine. But no such question was before
the court, and both the Chief Justice and Judge MfCLEAN
said nothing more than that the merits of that case, which
was an original suit in the Supreme Court, must be governed
by the same rules of law as would govern the circuit court
of the District of Virginia, if the case was pending before it;
but it does not appear that the question whether the case
with such parties could be sustained in that court had occurred to their minds. Such a suit, brought by the State of
Indiana, was tried by Mr. JusticeMcLEAN in the Circuit Court,
without the question being raised. It is the case Indiana v.
.2filler, 3 McLean 151, and was removed by consent from the
State court, and the facts stipulated for the judgment of the
court on the case.
No thought seems to have been given, either by the court
or counsel, to the question of jurisdiction.
On the other hand, we have the judgment of the circuit
court for the District of Georgia, as stated by Judge IREDELL,
in the case of the State of Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 Dallas
402. The case, as reported in Dallas, was a suit brought in
the Supreme Court by the State of Georgia, by a bill in chan-
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eery. Judge IREDELL, in his opinion, says that in a suit
about the same subject matter before him in the circuit, he
had refused to permit the State of Georgia to intervene, because the Circuit Court could have no jurisdiction of a case in
which a State was a party. He had then, at that early day,
decided this question; and though Mr. J'ustice WLsoN
thought it was error, he gives no reason for it which at this
day would have any weight.
The case of Gale v. Babcock, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 199, is also
directly in'point. Mr. Justice WASHINGTON in that case remanded it to the State court, on the ground that the Circuit
Courts had no jurisdiction of a suit to which a State was a
party. And in the very recent case of The State of North
Carolinav. Trustees, etc., 5 National Bankruptcy Register 466,
the Circuit Court of North Carolina decided the same way.
These three are all the direct decisions we have found, and
they all deny the jurisdiction.
We are well satisfied that such is the sound construction of the Constitution and the Acts of Congress bearing on
the question; and we have the less reluctance in dismissing
the bill, as we must for want of jurisdiction, in this court,
because we have no doubt that both the State courts of
Minnesota and the Supreme Court of the United States are
open to the State of Wisconsin for such relief as she may be
entitled to.
DILLON, J., concurred.

United States District Court-Southern District of New York.
BENJAmIN P. SHERmAN et al. v. JOHiN W. MOTT et al.
Where a collision occurs in consequence of a vessel being cut loose from her
moorings, in order to save her from sinking, it is not such an Inevitable acci.
dent or vis major, as will exempt her from liability for damage resulting from
the collision.
In voluntarily cutting herself loose she takes the risk of colliding, and hayIag collided must bear the consequence.
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. Sherman, for libellants.
. If Owen, for respondents.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
F

BLATCHFORD,

J.-The libellants, owners of the brig Isola,

file the libel against the respondents, owners of the schooner
Anne E. Glover, to recover for the dainages sustained by the
libellants through a collision which took place between the
brig and the schooner, in the harbor of Galveston, Texas, on
the 3d of October, 1867. On the morning of that day the
brig and the schooner were both of them lying, heading to
the westward, with their port sides against the outer end of
a wharf which was in the shape of the capital letter T. The
brig lay farther to the westward than the schooner did, and
was in ballast, ready for sea. The schooner lay with her
bow toward and near to the stern of the brig, and was loaded
with cargo, having just arrived from sea and not yet discharged. Astern of the schooner lay a bark with her starboard side to the wharf and her stern to the stern of the
schooner. These three vessels were all of them made fast by
lines to spiles on the wharf. A violent wind arose, blowing
quartering on the wharf, from abaft the beam on the'starboard
sides of the brig and the schooner. As the wind increased,
the brig broke loose from her moorings, tearing out the spiles
to which she was fastened, and was driven along the face of
the wharf, until she cleared the end of it, when an anchor
from her bow caused her stern to swing around by the west,
until she was brought by the anchor head to the wind, when
a second anchor was put out which brought her up, so that
she rode safely at anchor, at a distance of from 75 to 100
yards from the schooner. Not long afterward, the stern of the
bark was driven by the wind against the stern of the schooner,
and broke in the stern of the schooner, so that the sea entered, and there was danger that the schooner would sink.
with her cargo. at the wharf. In this emergency, as staled
in the answer, the master of the schooner, " acting for the
benefit of all concerned, for the purpose and with the motive
and intention of saving her and her cargo from total loss, cut
her loose from her moorings, but, befbre her anchors could be let
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go, and she could be thereby brought up, she was, notwithstanding every effort which it was possible to make to the contrary, driven upon the brig." The answer sets up that it
was impossible, under the circumstances, to prevent the collision; that such collision, so far as respected the schooner,
arose from an inevitable accident, by reason whereof each
vessel should sustain her own loss; and that there was no
fault on the part of th6 schooner. The brig was greatly
damaged by the collision, and the schooner, after remaining
for some time in contact with"and entangled with the brig, was
cleared, and then drifted still farther, until she grounded in
shoal water.
The contention on the part of the respondents is, that, inasmuch as the schooner was in a proper place when she was
cut loose, and was sufficiently secured to the wharf, and it was
proper for her safety and that of her cargo to cut her loose,
after she had been injured by the bark, so that she might be
driven by the wind and drift ashore in shoaler water, the case
is one of inevitable accident, or vis major, unless there was
some fault or negligence on the part of those in charge of her,
in managing her after she was cut loose, whereby she collided
with the brig. I cannot assent to this view of the law as to
inevitable accident. The act of the schooner, in being adrift,
was, on the pleadings and proofs, a voluntary act on her part.
It was willful and deliberate. It was done to save herself from
a greater peril by endeavoring to incur a less one. It is established, by the proofs, that, if she had not cast herself loose,
she would have remained where she was, only perhaps, sinking, and would not have collided with the brig. A collision
would have been impossible if she had not cut herself loose,
as a matter of voluntary choice. How, then, can it be properly said that the collision was an accident which could not
have been avoided, when it clearly appears that it would have
beeh avoided, if the schooner had not thus voluntarily chosen
to cut herself loose? It may be that, after she was cut loose,
all proper skill and caution on her part were observed. But
that is not the proper test. In cutting herself loose she took
the risk of hitting the brig, and must bear the consequences

